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INTRODUCTION

The Endangered Species Act' (ESA) is a stringent, multi-pronged
conservation statute. It protects species which have been listed as
endangered or threatened (listed species) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the habitat of such listed species.
To date, the ESA has not posed a major barrier to coal development, although it has increased regulatory compliance costs. Its
applicability is not widely recognized in the coal industry. While the
coal industry has not yet felt the full brunt of the ESA, the timber
industry has. Largely through environmental group efforts targeted
against the timber industry, the wide-ranging northern spotted owl
has been listed under the ESA and this threatens thousands of timber-related jobs in the Pacific Northwest. The increasing constraints
on timber harvesting to protect the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker are causing economic injury throughout the Southeast. It is
likely just a matter of time before identification of a wide-ranging
listed species will create similar problems for the coal industry.
This article provides a comprehensive description of the ESA for
the coal industry. We describe the major provisions of the ESA,
their application to the coal industry, and opportunities for industry
involvement.
In overview, the ESA has four major facets. First, ESA section
4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533, controls the listing of species. Section II discusses the listing process.
Second, after a wildlife species has been listed, ESA section 9,
16 U.S.C. § 1538, and its implementing regulations prohibit the
"taking" of that species. The taking prohibitions apply equally to
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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private, state, and federal actions anywhere in the United States.
Taking restrictions are becoming the ESA's most severe constraint
on natural resources development and industry. Section III addresses
ESA taking issues.
Third, ESA section 9 and its implementing regulations also bar
some types of destruction of listed plant species. Section IV discusses
these provisions.
Fourth, ESA section 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, establishes special
duties governing federal agency actions, including the issuance of
federal mineral leases and mining-related permits. Under ESA section 7(a)(2), federal agencies must consult with FWS on the effects
of their proposed actions. Most importantly, ESA section 7(a)(2)
bars federal agencies from undertaking or approving actions which
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or adversely
modify the species' critical habitat. Federal actions which would do
so can only be approved by a cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee. Additionally, ESA section 7(a)(1) requires federal agencies
to undertake programs for the conservation of listed species. Section
V explains the operation of these ESA provisions.
II.

THE ESA LISTING PROCESS
The ESA's constraints normally apply only after FWS lists a
species as endangered or threatened. 2 Species are considered for list2. The ESA does state that federal agencies "shall confer" with FWS on actions affecting
species "proposed to be listed." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988). This procedural duty to confer does
not limit the agency's ability to take the action or make a "commitment of resources." Id. However,
if the species later is listed, the ESA § 7(a)(2) prohibitions against jeopardizing the continued existence
of the listed species or adversely modifying its habitat apply to any portions of the action that have
not been implemented. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). Thus, the conference procedure offers an early
opportunity for the agency to structure its action so that it will not be constrained by a subsequent
listing. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.10 (1990).
For simplicity, this article will refer to FWS as the lead agency on ESA matters. The real
division is more complex. The ESA charges the Secretary of the Interior with responsibility for: (1)
listing species; (2) conducting ESA consultations involving terrestrial species; (3) enforcing civil penalties for ESA violations concerning terrestrial species; and (4) adopting most ESA regulations. See
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533, 1536, 1540 (1988). The Secretary of the Interior has delegated these
roles to FWS.
However, the Secretary of Commerce has authority to conduct ESA consultation, enforcement
and regulatory actions concerning listed marine species. See id. The Secretary of Commerce has delegated these roles to the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). Since the minerals industry
is primarily concerned with terrestrial species, the article refers to FWS.
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ing under the notice and comment rulemaking procedures of ESA

section 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533, and the 50 C.F.R. Part 424 rules. Before
discussing these procedures, we highlight the types of listing actions
and the ESA's unusual definition of a "species."
There are three major categories of listing actions. First, a species
may be listed as "endangered," which means "any species which
is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range." ' 3 Second, a species may be listed as "threatened," which
means ''any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." ' 4 The list of endangered and threatened fish and wildlife (collectively "wildlife") species appears in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h),
while 50 C.F.R. § 17.12(h) contains the list of endangered and
threatened plants. Third, FWS may designate "critical habitat" for
a species, which means those areas "essential for the conservation
of the species." 5 The list of designated critical habitat appears in
50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (wildlife) and § 17.96 (plants). 6
The ESA contains an unusual definition of "species." It includes, in addition to biological species, "any subspecies of fish or
wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (1988). Where critical habitat has been designated, federal actions may
not adversely modify that habitat in addition to not jeopardizing the continued existence of the species.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). Thus, the existence of critical habitat adds another standard for ESA
§ 7(a)(2) compliance.
While the text will focus on the rulemaking procedures for listing species, the designation of
critical habitat follows the same procedures with the following exceptions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)
(1988). First, FWS must consider the "economic impact" of designating critical habitat, while it cannot
consider the economic impacts of listing a species. Id. Second, though the ESA urges FW$ to designate
critical habitat at the same time a species is listed, the agency may defer designation in certain circumstances. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) (1988).
6. ESA § 4 allows two other types of listing actions in addition to the normal procedures for
listing endangered and threatened species and designating critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
First, it permits the emergency listing of a species without notice and comment rulemaking, though
the listing is effective only for a 240 day period. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1988). A preliminary injunction against the emergency listing of the desert tortoise was denied in City of Las Vegas v. Lujan,
891 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Second, ESA § 4 also permits petitions and FWS actions to de-list species and to modify
critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)-(3) (1988). These actions are subject to the same standards
and rulemaking procedures as an initial action to list. There have been very few de-listings.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature."' 7 Thus,
subspecies, and distinct populations of vertebrate species, may be

listed even though the species as a whole is not in trouble.'
The listing process usually starts with a petition by an environmental or biological interest group to list a particular species. Within

ninety days, FWS publishes its finding in the Federal Register on
whether the petition contains substantial scientific or commercial
information supporting the listing. If an affirmative finding is made,

FWS conducts a review of the species' status to assess whether a
proposed listing is warranted. Within twelve months after receiving
the petition, FWS must find whether a proposed listing action is
warranted and, if so, must publish a proposed rule to list a species
or to designate critical habitat. All of these findings are subject to
judicial review. 9

Once a proposed rule has been published, the public may submit
rulemaking comments on whether the species meets the criteria for
listing. Comments also may be submitted at the required public hearing or through state officials.10 FWS ordinarily must publish a final
rulemaking decision to list or not list within twelve months after
publication of the proposed rule."

7. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1988).
8. FWS has done so on several occasions. For example, the northern spotted owl is a subspecies; there also are California spotted owl and Mexican spotted owl subspecies.
The ability to list subspecies and distinct populations greatly expands the potential reach of
the ESA. Many common species are rare at the fringes of their ranges. Consequently, the fringe
populations of even plentiful species arguably could be listed. See M. BEaN, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 331-32 (1983).
The wisdom of allowing the listing of subspecies and distinct populations can be questioned.
One argument for preserving an endangered species is the desire to protect a unique gene pool for
the possible next miracle medicine. This argument does not apply where other unthreatened subspecies
or populations would remain. Additionally, we wonder whether the economic and societal costs of
preserving every subspecies and fringe population are justified. Shrinking ranges and extinction itself
are parts of natural selection and evolution. See also infra note 14.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (1989). In Northern Spotted Owl v.
Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988), the court found that FWS had acted arbitrarily in not
adequately explaining its decision not to propose the listing of the northern spotted owl. On remand,
FWS decided to propose the listing and ultimately listed the northern spotted owl as a threatened
species. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5) (1988).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (1988).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

The Conference Report on the 1982 ESA amendments expressly
states that decisions to list "species are based solely upon biological
criteria and ... prevent non-biological considerations [e.g., the economic impacts of listing] from affecting such decisions.' ' 2 The ESA
phrase embodying this legislative intent is the section 4(b)(1)(A) requirement that FWS employ "the best scientific and commercial data
available" in making listing decisions. An FWS regulation, 50 C.F.R.
§ 424.11(b), confirms that listing determinations cannot consider
"economic or other impacts of such determination."
FWS must list a species if it finds, based on the best scientific
and commercial data available and taking into account the efforts
being made by states and foreign nations, that the species is endangered or threatened because of: (1) present or threatened modification of its habitat or range; (2) overutilization of the species
for commercial (e.g., import-export trade), recreational (e.g., hunting), or educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other natural or
man-made factors affecting its continued existence." Thus, a species
must be listed if it is endangered or threatened for any biological
or man-made reason and regardless of the economic and social costs
14
to society.

12. H.R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) and (b)(1) (1988). One unreported case held that FWS has no duty

to list even if one of the § 1533(a) factors is present - it may decide not to list if, considering federal
and state conservation efforts under § 1533(b)(1), the species is not endangered or threatened. American
Fisheries Soc'y v. Verity, No. 88-0174-RAR-JFM (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1989).

14. One can question the wisdom of striving to protect every last species and distinct population.
Since extinction is a part of natural selection (the "survival of the fittest"), efforts to save species
which are becoming extinct for "natural" reasons (e.g., they are poor competitors) often are doomed
to failure or are costly attempts to delay evolutionary succession.
Even where man causes the extinction threat, the economic and social costs of preservation
may outweigh the benefits of preservation. One common benefit asserted for species preservation is
the contribution the species makes to biological diversity and ecosystem stability. Yet, the species'
contribution is often negligible by the time it is listed.
The absolutist ESA keeps the listing process biologically pure and, unfortunately, postpones
the balancing of the desirability of species preservation versus its societal costs until the Endangered
Species Committee considers ESA exemptions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1988). This solution greatly
increases ESA compliance costs as compared to the solution of considering all impacts in the listing
decision itself.
It seems illogical that "economic impacts" can be considered in deciding whether to designate
critical habitat by rule (see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)), but cannot be considered in deciding whether
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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Under the existing ESA framework, the coal industry and other
entities interested in influencing listing decisions must do so on biological grounds. Entities desiring to defeat a listing proposal should
review the record, retain an expert biologist, and use that biologist
to help frame rulemaking comments on why the species is not in
fact endangered or threatened.' 5
Alternatively, industry may desire to show that mining did not
cause the species' decline and would not jeopardize the continued
existence of the species. This worked well for the coal mining industry in Alabama. It secured favorable statements in the preamble
to the rule listing the flattened musk turtle which helped ensure that
coal mining would be largely unaffected by the listing.'6
Challenges to rules which list species have been infrequent and
unsuccessful. One such challenge resulted in a ruling that no en17
vironmental impact statement is required on listings.
III.

A.

THE PROHIBITIONS ON TAKING LISTED WILDLIFE SPECIES

The Agency's View

This subsection describes the prohibitions on "taking" listed
wildlife species assuming that FWS's views and the current fragmentary case law on the subject are correct. Subsection B presents
some reasons for questioning those views.
FWS's view is that the same prohibition against taking applies
to both endangered and threatened wildlife species. The ESA itself
only makes it unlawful for any "person" to "take" any "endan-

to list a species by rule. Since FWS has been granted the authority to consider economics on some
matters, it should be granted the authority to do so in deciding whether to list a particular species.
In sum, we believe that Congress got it right the first time and should again permit FWS to consider
economics and all other pertinent matters in making listing decisions.
15. See Brooks and O'Riordan, The ESA: A Practitioner'sPoint of View, 4 NAT. Rns. & ENV'T
29 (1990).
16. See 52 Fed. Reg. 22,418, 22,424-25 (1987).
17. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
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gered species of fish or wildlife." 18 By regulation, FWS has extended
the same taking prohibitions to threatened wildlife species. 19
The same ESA taking prohibitions apply to private, state, and
federal actions on private, state, or federal lands in the United States.
The ESA makes it unlawful for any "person" to "take" an endangered wildlife species anywhere "in the United States," and defines a "person" broadly to include any private or governmental
entity.2
The ESA allows four types of enforcement actions against unlawful takings. First, FWS may assess civil penalties of up to $25,000
for a "knowing" violation of a taking prohibition, and the civil
penalties can be contested administratively followed by judicial review.2 1 Second, the federal government may bring criminal penalty
actions in district court with maximum penalties of $50,000 and one
year's imprisonment for a "knowing" violation. 2 Third, the Department of Justice may bring actions in district court to enjoin
takings.7- Fourth, any person, including an environmental group,
can bring a citizen suit to enjoin takings and other ESA violations.4
The ESA defines "take" as meaning "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct."21 While the meaning of most of these
words is clear, the meanings of "harass" and "harm" are not.
FWS regulations define the terms "harass" and "harm" broadly:

18. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988).

19. The blanket rule against taking threatened wildlife, unless there is a special rule to the
contrary in place, is found in 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1990). This blanket rule is based on the 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(d) authority to extend the ESA's prohibitions with respect to endangered wildlife species to
particular threatened wildlife species, and the 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(G) statement that the violation
of such regulations is unlawful.
The taking prohibitions do not apply to listed plant species. Instead, listed plants are subject
to a different, less burdensome regulatory regime. See infra Section IV.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(13), 1538(a)(l)(B) (1988). A case holding that a city was not a "person"
under the ESA definition, United States v. City of Rancho Palos Verde, 841 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988),
was effectively reversed by a 1988 amendment to that definition.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (1988); 50 C.F.R. Part 11 (1989).

22. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (1988).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6) (1988).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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"Harass" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an intentional or negligent
act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it
to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns, which
include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering.
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act which actually kills
or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.26

The "harm" definition creates the greatest potential constraint
on coal and other forms of development, for it prohibits some types
of habitat modification. It might bar any habitat modification which
injures even one individual of a listed wildlife species by significantly
impairing its essential behavioral patterns. For example, a surface
coal mining operation which would remove vegetative cover previously used as shelter by a listed wildlife species or as habitat for
its prey arguably would be prohibited under the "harm" definition.
Thus, the "harm" definition may make many private land development actions unlawful. Two sets of cases illustrate the potentially
wide sweep of "harm."
The Palila cases are the leading cases on the meaning of "harm." 27
They were ESA citizen suits brought by environmental groups to
require the State of Hawaii to manage its lands to protect the palila
bird. 28 The key facts in the Palila cases were: (1) the state allowed
feral goats and sheep to remain on its lands; (2) the goats and sheep
ate seedlings of the mamane tree; (3) the palila depended on mature
mamane trees for food and shelter in its sole surviving habitat; and
(4) the grazing by goats and sheep reduced or prevented the regeneration of mamanes, and thereby injured the palila's recovery and,
arguably, its ability to survive in the future.
The Palila I decisions essentially held that the habitat modifications caused by the goats and sheep "harmed" the palila (even

26. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1989).
27. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979),
aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter "Palila I"); Pala v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and
Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (hereinafter

"Palila II").
28. The ESA allows citizen suits to enforce the taking prohibitions and other ESA requirements.

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
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though the palila population was stable or increasing) and that the
state was responsible for this harm-type taking. Hawaii was directed
to allow a hunting season to destroy the offending sheep and goats.
The PaUla I case was decided under FWS's initial definition of
"harm." An Interior Solicitor's opinion concluded that the cases
were wrongly decided and directed a rulemaking to restrict the
"harm" definition, but the final revised definition of "harm" does
not differ substantially from the initial one. 29
Following their Palila I victory, the environmental group plaintiffs instituted the Palila II action contending that mouflon sheep
were harming the palila in similar ways. The district court found a
harm-type taking and broadly construed the "harm" definition. It
held that 'harm' does not require death to individual members of
the species." ' 30 It found that "harm" includes a future injury to
either the survival or recovery of a listed species. Even though the
palila population and its food sources were currently stable, the
sheep's grazing on mamane seedlings was "harm" because it prevented the growth of the next generation of mamane needed for the
31
future survival and recovery of the palila.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the
"harm" definition does include significant habitat modifications
which threaten a listed species with extinction in the future and that
this definition is allowed by the ESA.12 The Ninth Circuit declined
to rule on "whether the district court properly found that harm

29. The Solicitor's opinion, published with the proposed rule, concluded that the ESA limited
"harm" to situations where there was an actual injury to a listed species but, since the palila population
was stable or increasing, there was no "harm" in the PaUla I situation. See 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490,
29,492 n.2 (1981). The proposed rule redefined "harm" to mean "an act or omission which injures
or kills wildlife" and omitted any direct reference that habitat modification could be harm. Id. at
29,490.
After adverse comments from environmental groups, FWS adopted the current definition of
"harm." See 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981). It continues the concept that habitat modifications are
"harm" where they injure listed wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns. The
preamble to the final rule confirms that "harm" does not require "direct physical injury to an
individual member of the wildlife species." Id.
30. 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
31. Id. at 1075-80.
32. 852 F.2d at 1108-09.
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included habitat degradation that prevents recovery of an endan' 33
gered species.
In sum, the Palilacases seem to support the following principles.
First, ESA taking prohibitions apply to nonfederal lands and persons. Second, "harm" may be proven without a direct physical injury to a listed species or a corpus delecti. Third, habitat modification
actions which threaten the extinction of a listed wildlife species may
be enjoined even though the extinction threat would not occur for
decades. Fourth, habitat modification actions which retard the recovery of a listed species are "harm" under the district court's opinion. The Ninth Circuit did not rule on this issue and the district
court's opinion seems to be contrary to the federal government's
position. Fifth, nonfederal entities may be required to take affirmative action (e.g., removing the goats and sheep) to create habitat
conditions necessary for a listed species' survival and, perhaps, recovery. These principles have the potential to greatly restrict private
land use.
The other major "harm" case is Sierra Club v. Lyng 4 The case
was an ESA citizen suit concerning management of National Forests
in Texas to protect the red-cockaded woodpecker. The district court
agreed with the Palila holdings that harm "does not necessarily require the proof of the death of specific or individual members of
the species." 3 Instead, harm can be proven largely by population
declines where the land management "practices themselves have
'36
caused and accelerated the decline."
Judge Parker found that timber harvesting practices caused
"harm" by impairing the woodpecker's breeding and feeding be-

33. Id. at 1110-11. The first involvement of the federal government in the Palila cases was the
filing of an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit. It urged the Court not to reach the issue of whether
an injury to recovery is harm and argued that the ESA does not require nonfederal entities to assist

in the recovery of listed species (i.e., the district court's conclusion that the harm definition barred
nonfederal actions which retard recovery was wrong). See "Brief For The United States As Amicus
Curiae" Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (No.

87-2188).
34. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), appealpending sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, No.
88-6041 (5th Cir.).
35. 694 F. Supp. at 1270.
36. by
Id.
at 1271.
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haviors.3 7 He entered an injunction barring most timber harvesting
within three-fourths of a mile of woodpecker colonies." Thus, Sierra
Club v. Lyng holds that the development of large land areas can
be enjoined to prevent harm-type takings.
The Palila and Sierra Club v. Lyng cases are the only reported
cases involving harm-type takings for habitat modification. This raises
the question of whether the "harm" definition's bark is worse than
its bite. Although the "harm" definition has been on the books for
roughly fifteen years, the federal government has brought no enforcement actions in court to enjoin habitat modifications and FWS
has brought only a handful of administrative civil penalty cases.39
Environmental groups have brought only a few harm-type takings
cases and only one against private landowners °
Instead of enforcing the "harm" definition directly through civil
and criminal penalty and injunctive relief actions, FWS relies largely
on threats of prosecution to induce compliance. FWS often sends
letters to private landowners warning them that their land development activities could cause harm-type takings and mentioning the
ESA's stringent penalties for takings.
FWS also has threatened state and local government officials
with taking prosecutions if their actions in approving private development result in ESA takings. These threats often cause government officials to deny the needed permits and thereby avoid the
ESA taking issue. 41

37. Id. at 1271-72.
38. Id. at 1277-78.
39. The administrative civil penalty cases largely involve cutting down nest trees of listed birds.
The dearth of federal ESA enforcement actions against habitat modifications may suggest that the
federal government perceives some ESA limits on the meaning of "harm" such as those suggested

in the 1981 Solicitor's opinion and the government's 1987 amicus brief in Pala. See supra notes 29
and 33. Alternatively, the lack of aggressive enforcement might be attributable to a political judgment
that it is unfair or unwise to seek to greatly restrict private land development.
40. The PaUla and Sierra Club v. Lyng cases were suits brought by environmental groups under
the ESA citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
The one citizen suit against development of private lands was dismissed for the environmental
group's failure to provide the sixty days advance notice of a citizen suit required by 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g). Protect Our Eagles' Trees v. City of Lawrence, Kansas, 715 F. Supp. 996 (D. Kan. 1988).

41. This process is described in a recent article:
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More recently, FWS has employed this tactic to get state officials
to enforce ESA taking concepts under state law. Several states have
Forest Practices Acts which require state forestry department approval before timber harvesting can occur on private lands. After
the listing of the northern spotted owl, FWS published guidelines
on the timber harvesting restrictions it thought were necessary to
avoid ESA takes of the owl and implied that state officials could
be guilty of takings if they approved timber harvesting which resulted in ESA takings. 42
In response, the state of Washington adopted a version of FWS's
owl-specific taking guidelines as the governing principles for when
the state would permit timber harvesting on state and private lands
under its Forest Practices Act. California responded by adopting
emergency regulations which require a state-certified biologist to apply FWS's general definitions of "harm" and "harass" in deciding
what types of timber harvesting California will allow under its Forest
Practices Act. In both states, private timber harvesting has been
precluded on substantial acreage due largely to FWS's "harm" definition and state adoption of variants of that definition.

violate ESA and be subject to its civil and criminal penalties if they allow development
within the habitats of listed species. A typical letter from USFWS to one California city
that proposed to zone property for development within the habitat of an endangered species
stated:
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ... makes it unlawful for any person
to take an endangered species without a permit ... Section 11 of the Act prescribes civil
penalties of up to $10,000, or imprisonment for up to one year, or both, for knowingly
violating any provision of the Endangered Species Act ....
[W]e must advise you, unless
you first secure a Section 10(a) permit authorizing the incidental take . . ., the approval
and implementation of the proposed action may subject ... city officials to investigations
by our law enforcement branch regarding potential violations of the Endangered Species
Act.
City councilmen listen when told they may go to jail for issuing a grading permit, notwithstanding the considerable legal uncertainty whether USFWS would have the authority
to prosecute a city official under ESA for approving development in the habitat of an
endangered species.
Thornton, Takings under Endangered Species Act Section 9, 4 NAT. Rrs. & ENV'T 7, 50-51 (1990).
42. See "Procedures Leading To Endangered Species Act Compliance For The Northern Spotted
Owl" 9-13 (FWS Region 1 July 1990). The Procedures suggested that, to avoid a harm-type taking,
up to 4,000 acres for each owl pair should be protected against habitat modification by timber harvesting.
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Thus, FWS has successfully enlisted state and local officials to
enforce ESA taking concepts by denying private development permits under state and local law. This raises the spectre that the same
thing could happen to the coal industry under state laws regulating
mining.
In should be noted, however, that there are, at least formally,
ways to proceed with development activities that may harm or otherwise take listed species inadvertently. The ESA offers two mechanisms to reduce or avoid takings liability. Both were adopted in
the 1982 ESA amendments to create mechanisms allowing otherwise
lawful activities which incidentally take listed wildlife species. One
mechanism is available for federally authorized actions and the other
for purely nonfederal actions not requiring a federal permit.
For federal actions, FWS may issue an incidental take statement
along with its biological opinion following ESA section 7 consultation.4 1 If FWS concludes that the action would not jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species, it provides the persons undertaking the action with a statement specifying the types and amount
of incidental taking allowed and steps that must be followed to
minimize incidental taking. Any taking that complies with the statement is not a violation of the ESA.
For nonfederal actions, ESA section 10(a) allows FWS to issue
incidental take permits." However, the process is cumbersome and
only a few permits have been issued. 45 As the price to eliminate
exposure to takings claims, the applicant must prepare and fund a
conservation plan for the listed species. It must minimize and mitigate takings to FWS's satisfaction.
B.

Some Questions On The Agency's View Of ESA Takings
FWS's view of ESA taking law, presented above, is open to
question on several grounds. The questions include: (1) does the ESA
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) and (o) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1988).
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988). The implementing regulations for incidental take permits
for endangered species are codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b), and for threatened species are codified
at 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b) (1988). The two regulatory processes are nearly identical.
45. See Thornton, Takings under Endangered Species Act Section 9, 4 NAT. REs. & ENV'T 7
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exclude otherwise lawful habitat modification actions from being
takings; (2) is FWS's blanket regulatory extension of the taking prohibitions to all threatened wildlife species unlawful; (3) are ESA
takings limited to violations of state law; and (4) if habitat modification by private landowners can be takings, are they not limited
to situations where the action would lead to the extinction of the
listed species?
As presented below, there are substantial grounds for concluding
that the answer to all these questions is "yes." These questions have
not been fully aired or resolved in litigation.
1. FWS's "Harm" Definition May Be Ultra Vires Of The
ESA
As presented above, FWS's regulatory definition of "harm" provides that development causing habitat modification is an ESA taking if it injures listed wildlife by significantly impairing the species'
essential behavioral patterns. There are credible arguments that Congress did not include habitat modification actions within the concept
of "take" and, therefore, the "harm" definition is ultra vires and
beyond the regulatory authority delegated by the ESA.
The arguments can be summarized as follows: Since the Senate
Committee on Commerce expressly rejected a definition of "take"
which included habitat modification, FWS's contrary regulation is
improper; 46 when "harm" was added to the "take" definition on
the Senate floor, it was described as a "technical" amendment and

46. S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1973). The bill considered by the Senate Committee
would have defined "take" to mean "to threaten, harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to threaten,

harass, hunt, capture, or kill; or the destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range."
S. 1983 as reported by the Senate Committee removed the habitat modification language entirely and,

instead, defined "take" as "harass, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or
to attempt to engage in any such conduct." S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). While
the Senate Report states that take is defined "in the broadest possible manner," that broad definition

does not include habitat modification since habitat modification language had been rejected and since
the adopted definition does not include the "harm" concept that FWS believes incorporates habitat

modification. Id. at 7. Since Congress rejected habitat modification as a form of taking, FWS's
definition of "harm" arguably unlawfully reaches a result Congress "expressly declined to enact."
(1974).
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no legislative history affirmatively states that "harm" includes hab47
itat modification.
Moreover, while Congress was aware that habitat modifications
could jeopardize the continued existence of listed species, the legislative history suggests that land acquisition to protect habitat, not
the taking prohibition, was the sole mechanism chosen to avoid detrimental habitat modifications on nonfederal lands.48

47. During Senate floor passage of the ESA, Senator Tunney offered a "series of technical
and clarifying amendments" which included adding "harm" to the definition of "take." 119 CoNo.
REc. 25,682-83 (1973). He described that the amendments "are, as I indicate, technical in nature.
They are important, however." Id. at 25,683. These technical amendments were adopted without any
substantive discussion or suggestion that the "harm" concept included habitat modification. Id. Since
the Senate Commerce Committee had expressly rejected including habitat modification in the "take"
definition, it seems illogical to conclude that the Senate reincorporated this rejected view through a
"technical" amendment. This seems particularly illogical because the inclusion of habitat modification
would be a major substantive expansion of the types of activities covered by "take" and not merely
a "technical" or perfecting amendment.
48. The Senate Report which had excluded habitat modification from the "harm" definition
stated that "jo]ften, protection of habitat is the only means of protecting endangered animals which
occur on non-public lands ... an accelerated land acquisition program is essential." S. REP. No.
307, supra note 46, at 4. This suggests that "take" does not include habitat modification of "nonpublic lands" and that federal land acquisition was the mechanism chosen to avoid undesirable habitat
modification of private lands.
Just before Senator Tunney offered his "technical" amendment adding "harm" to the "take"
definition, he described the problem of habitat modification ("species have been inadvertently exterminated by a negligent destruction of their habitat") and that land acquisition was the legislative
answer to this problem ("[t]hrough these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve
habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction"). 119 CoNo. REc. 25,669
(1973). In his next paragraph, Senator Tunney contrasted the habitat modification problem to be
corrected by land acquisition with the predation or killing problem to be corrected by the prohibition
on taking:
Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of their natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by man for
commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S. 1983 would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of endangered species ....
Id. Thus, Senator Tunney, the sponsor of the technical change in the definition of "take," did not
believe that the take concept included habitat modification and believed that land acquisition was the
sole legislative solution to habitat modification problems.
This belief was shared by other Senators. Senator Williams also mentioned that one "of the
major causes of the decline in wildlife populations is the destruction of their habitat" and therefore,
"S. 1983 gives the Secretary authority to acquire any real property which he determines to be necessary
in order to protect and restore an endangered or threatened species." 119 CoNo. REc. 25,676 (1973).
Senator Stevens stated that "[land acquisition and other similar conservation measures actually will
do more to protect many species of endangered animals than preventing their taking." 119 Cowo.
REc. 25,678 (1973).
Most significantly, after the "take" definition had been technically altered by adding "harm,"
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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Finally, in light of this legislative history, three law review com-

mentaries have strongly questioned whether habitat modification can
be considered a type of ESA taking. 49
fication problems would be dealt with through land acquisition. For example, Senator Nelson stated:
Because of this act, an animal or fish species will not be overtly "taken." Yet, it is common
knowledge that there is another danger to our wildlife, a threat which is unavoidable: the
expansion of our cities and industries .... This act acknowledges that habitat modification
is liable to be increasingly prevalent as the cause of future habitat losses. The Secretaries
of Interior and Commerce are authorized to acquire the lands upon which endangered and
threatened species reside and funds are provided for this purpose. Habitat acquisition will
provide a framework, a base for the construction of true sanctuaries, preserve[d] free from
harmful human intrusions.
119 CONG. REc. 25,691 (1973) (emphasis added).
The legislative history before the House of Representatives is similar. The bill reported by the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries did not expressly include either habitat modification or "harm" in the "take" definition and referred to land acquisition as the answer for avoiding
undesirable habitat modification. See H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, 9, 11-13 (1973).
On the House floor, Representative Sullivan described land acquisition as the sole answer to the
problem of habitat modification:
For the most, the principal threat to animals stem from the destruction of their habitat
.... H.R. 37 will meet this problem by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat ....
119 CoN . REc. 30,162 (1973). In a separate paragraph, Representative Sullivan describes the different
wildlife threats that would be addressed by the taking prohibition:
Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill them
for pleasure or profit. There is no way that the Congress can make it less pleasurable for
a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less profitable for them to do
so. H.R. 37 makes it a Federal offense to violate [taking prohibitions].
Id.
Thus, Representative Sullivan divorced habitat modification from the taking concept. Floor
statements by Representatives Dingell, Biaggi and Harrington do the same thing. See 119 CoNG. REc.
30,163, 30,166 (1973). No Representative or Senator expressed the view that otherwise lawful development activities which altered habitat could be a taking.
The Conference Report adopted the Senate's definition of "take" (e.g., including the technical
amendment of the Senate adding "harm," a concept that was not in the House-passed bill), did not
comment on the meaning of "take" and stated that an "effective program for the conservation of
endangered species demands that there be adequate authority vested in the program managers to
acquire habitat which is critical to the survival of those species." H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4, 25 (1973). During the Senate passage of the Conference Report, Senator Moss referred
to the taking prohibitions as being directed "against those who knowingly for commercial purposes
destroy endangered or threatened species" and Senator Stevens stated that "effective programs for
the conservation of endangered species requires the acquisitions of habitat crucial to the species."
119 CoNG. REc. 42,451, 42,535 (1973). This seems to continue the dichotomy that habitat modification
problems would be dealt with through land acquisition while only actions which knowingly kill listed
wildlife are prevented by the definition of "take."
49. See Lachenmeier, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: PreservationOr Pandemonium, 5
EiwTL. L. 29, 39-41 (1974); Note, Obligationsof FederalAgencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, 28 STAN. L. R.v. 1247, 1251 n.31 (1976); Note, EndangeredSpecies Act: Constitutional
100 n.19 (1977). Additionally, the first 17
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These credible arguments that otherwise lawful habitat modification actions cannot be ESA takings have not yet been addressed
by any court. Although there are respectable arguments on the other
side,50 the case against the current FWS view is thus a strong one.
2. FWS's View That Taking Prohibitions Apply
Automatically to Every Threatened Species Is Questionable
The ESA itself only makes the taking of an endangered wildlife
species unlawful, but allows FWS to make the taking of threatened
wildlife unlawful in certain circumstances. 51 In 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a),
FWS adopted a blanket rule extending the taking prohibitions to all
threatened wildlife species unless it adopts a special rule for a particular species to the contrary. It is questionable whether 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.31(a) conforms to the ESA and its legislative history.
The text of ESA section 4(d) seems to permit FWS to prohibit
the taking of a threatened wildlife species only after the "species is
listed" and only based on findings that the taking prohibitions are
"necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such

edition of a leading treatise on wildlife law states that "there are forceful arguments that such a
broad definition of take [in FWS's definition of "harm" is improper." M. BEAN, Tim EvotrroioN
OF NATIONAL WIILEFE LAW 397 (1977).
50. For example, since the ESA's purposes include providing "a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved," arguably preventing
modifications of those ecosystems through the taking prohibition is consistent with the legislative
purpose. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988). However, the legislative history presented above suggests that
the land acquisition provisions of 16 U.S.C. § 1534 provide the sole means of protecting habitat.
Another argument is that both the House and Senate Reports state that "take" is defined
"broadly" or "in the broadest possible manner." H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 48, at 11; S. R P,.
No. 307, supra note 46, at 7. However, since the "take" definition adopted by the Committees did
not include "harm," and FWS relies on the "harm" definition to prohibit some forms of habitat
modifications, there is no legislative history supporting a broad interpretation of "harm." Instead,
"harm" was added as a "technical" amendment.
The third argument supporting FWS's broad regulatory definition of "harm" is the principle
that courts should defer to agency regulations which are a reasonable interpretation of the legislative
history. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84445 (1984). It is questionable whether FWS's definition of "harm" is a reasonable interpretation of
the ESA and its legislative history.
51. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(d), 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6

18

MacLeod et al.: The Endangered Species Act: A Comprehensive Evaluation for the Co
1991]

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

species." ' 52 Thus, the statute on its face would allow only a postlisting extension of the taking prohibitions to a particular threatened
wildlife species based on species-specific findings. This precludes 50
C.F.R. § 17.31(a)'s blanket extension to all threatened wildlife species, without the necessary findings.
The legislative history reinforces the statutory language that the
taking prohibition could be extended only on a threatened speciesby-species basis.5 3 Consequently, the 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) blanket
prohibition against taking any threatened species seems to be inconsistent with both the ESA and its legislative history.
Moreover, the legislative history drives home the intent that different regulatory regimes should apply to endangered species and
threatened species; after all, that is why Congress created the sep52. ESA § 4(d) provides:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to
provide for the conservation of such species. The Secretary may by regulation prohibit with
respect to any threatened species any act prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) of this title,
in the case of fish or wildlife, or section 1538(a)(2) of this title, in the case of plants, with
respect to endangered species; except that with respect to the taking of resident species of
fish or wildlife, such regulations shall apply in any State which has entered into a cooperative
agreement pursuant to section 1535(c) of this title only to the extent that such regulations
have also been adopted by such State.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988).
53. During the 1973 Senate hearings, Department of the Interior representatives stated that,
with respect to threatened species, taking prohibitions "would have to be drafted in a case-by-case
manner, and that is as the statute contemplates." Hearings at 54; see id. at 74 ("[a]s to the second
category, the Secretary would have the discretion to impose certain regulatory measures necessary to
that particular case"). The Senate Report states that, "once he has listed a species of fish or wildlife
as a threatened species, ...

he may make any or all of the acts ...

[prohibited] as to 'endangered

species' also prohibited as to the particular threatened species." S. REP. No. 307, supra note 46, at
8.
The House Report is equally emphatic that once "an animal is on the threatened list, the
Secretary has almost an infinite number of options available to him ... he may choose to forbid
both taking and importation but allow the transportation of such species." H.R. REP. No. 412, supra
note 48, at 12. The Report includes a letter from the Department of the Interior stating that the
"type and degree of control exercised in this latter instance [over threatened species] would depend
on the circumstance of each species and could include a complete or partial ban if deemed appropriate." Id. at 23. On the House floor, Representative Goodling stated that regulations on threatened
species would be "based upon their individual status" and that this provides desirable "flexibility."
119 CoNo. Rc. 30,164 (1973).
Thus, it appears that Congress and the Department of the Interior agreed that no taking prohibitions would automatically apply to threatened species upon their listing, and the prohibitions would
apply only if FVS adopted an affirmative postlisting regulation specific to a particular species.
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arate endangered and threatened categories.54 Since 50 C.F.R. §
17.31(a) creates the same regulatory regime for most endangered and
threatened species, arguably it is ultra vires of the ESA for this
reason also.
One appellate decision can be read, however, to suggest otherwise. In Sierra Club v. Clark,55 the Eighth Circuit struck down FWS's
attempt to allow regulated trapping of the threatened timber wolf.
The court ruled that FWS could affirmatively authorize the hunting
and trapping of a threatened species only when it would assist in
its "conservation" by reducing population pressures.
That ruling could arguably require FWS to prohibit the taking
of almost all threatened species since takings rarely assist in the
conservation of a listed species. Though a court could require a
species-specific regulation before the taking prohibitions are extended to a particular threatened species, under this reading of Sierra
Club v. Clark, such a regulation would have to follow in most instances.
Other courts might decide not to follow Sierra Club v. Clark on
the ground that it was wrongly decided. Despite the opinion's efforts
to show that it was consistent with the ESA legislative intent, it does
seem to destroy the distinction between endangered and threatened
species and FWS's discretion to allow the taking of threatened species, which were intended by Congress.56 Alternatively, Sierra Club
v. Clark could be limited to situations involving governmental
pro"regulatedgrams which affirmatively provide for the hunting (the
regulated taking) of threatened species. As the district court stated

54. The 1973 ESA created different categories of endangered and threatened species, and its
legislative history suggests that there should be meaningful distinctions between the regulatory regimes

for the two categories. The Senate Report notes that, by "creating two levels of protection, regulatory
mechanisms may be more easily tailored." S. REP. No. 307, supra note 46, at 3. Senator Tunney
stated that the "two levels of classification facilitate regulations that are tailored to the needs of the
animal while minimizing the use of the most stringent prohibitions." 119 Cong. Rec. 25,669 (1973).
The distinction between endangered versus threatened wildlife arguably is obliterated by subjecting
both categories to the same taking prohibitions, as 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) does.
55. 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).

56. See supra notes 53 and 54.
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it, the issue concerned when "the Secretary may exercise his dis' 57
cretion by ordering the taking of an animal.
In sum, while the legality of the 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) blanket
extension of taking prohibitions to all threatened species can be
questioned, it is uncertain how a court would rule on this issue.
3.
Law

ESA Takings Might Be Limited To Violations Of State

Another possible limit to the applicability the ESA definition of
"take" and FWS's definition of "harm" and "harass" is the view
that an action is an ESA taking only to the extent it violates state
law in a state with a cooperative agreement. This interpretation derives from ESA section 4(d) and its interplay with ESA section 6.
ESA section 6 allows a state to develop a listed species conservation program which, if approved by FWS, entitles the state to a
cooperative agreement and partial federal funding of the state program.58 ESA section 6(c)(1) has alternative approval standards for
state conservation programs for listed wildlife species: (1) the more
difficult standards of section 6(c)(1)(A)-(E), where a qualifying state
is called a "full authority" state; and (2) the more easily met standards referenced in section 6(c)(1)(E)(i), where a qualifying state is
called a "limited authority" state.
ESA section 6(c)(1)(ii) notes that the approval of a "limited authority" cooperative agreement "shall not affect the applicability of
prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to section 1533(d)
of this title or section 1538(a)(1) of this title with respect to the
taking of any resident endangered or threatened species." By inference, this suggests that the law of a "full authority" state does
override the ESA's taking prohibitions. Several other ESA provisions
expand on this "reverse preemption" concept that state law controls
what is an ESA taking in a "full authority" state.

57. 577 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd in pertinent part, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir.
1985).
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) and (d) (1988).
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First, ESA section 4(d) provides that federal regulations on taking any threatened wildlife species "shall apply in any state which
has entered into a cooperative agreement pursuant to section 1535(c)
only to the extent that such regulations have also been adopted by

such state."' 59 Therefore, it seemingly provides that, in a "full authority" cooperative agreement state, an action is a taking of a
threatened wildlife species resident in that state only to the extent
the action violates a state regulation. The legislative history of ESA

section 4(d) supports this reading. 60
Second, with respect to endangered wildlife, section 9(a)(1) provides that an action is a taking only "as provided in section[]
1535(g)(2) [ESA section 6(g)(2)] of this title." The referenced ESA
section 6(g)(2), though poorly drafted, seems to mean the following:
in a cooperative agreement state, state taking law is controlling as
to what is a taking under the ESA for most endangered wildlife,
but the federal definitions of "take" apply to endangered wildlife
species covered by an international treaty or another federal law.6'
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988), quoted in full supra note 52.
60. The federal-state relationship on enforcement of wildlife laws was one of the most controversial issues during passage of the ESA. The Conference Report states that "the law will apply
as it would have under the House bill" and that "[wihere cooperative agreements are in force, these
will of course direct and control the enforcement of endangered and threatened species programs."
H.R. REP. No. 740, supra note 48, at 26. The House Report provides that, in cooperative agreement
states, "Federal enforcement powers will thereafter be coextensive and concurrent with state powers
of enforcement." H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 48, at 12. The statements that cooperative agreements
"control" enforcement and that federal enforcement is "coextensive" with state enforcement powers
suggest that state law does control what would be a taking under the ESA.
The legislative history of the 1977 ESA amendments adding the easier standards for obtaining
a cooperative agreement and adding 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1)(E)(ii) also supports this reading. Representative Leggett stated that under "existing law, when a State signs a cooperative agreement with
the Federal Government covering resident wildlife, the prohibitions of the Endangered Species Act
are waived." 123 CONG. RFc. 38,165 (1977).
61. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 1973 U.S. CODE & ADMiN. NEws
(87 Stat.) 979, 988-9. ESA § 6(g)(2) provides in pertinent part:
The prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to sections 1533(d) and 1538(a)(1)(B)
of this title shall not apply with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species
or threatened species (other than species listed in Appendix I to the Convention or otherwise
specifically covered by any other treaty or Federal law) within any State(A) which is then a party to a cooperative agreement with the Secretary pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section (except to the extent that the taking of any such species is
contrary to the law of such State) ....
16 U.S.C. § 1535(g)(2) (1988).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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Thus, portions of the ESA suggest that it is a "reverse preemption" statute which retains the states' historically dominant role
in wildlife law by providing that state law controls what is an ESA
taking in many instances. Since the laws of many states do not define
"take" to include habitat modifications, habitat modification actions may not be ESA takings in those states (if the state is a "full
authority" cooperative agreement state, and if the species is not an
endangered species covered by a federal treaty or other law) under
this theory.
Yet, this theory also has not been tested in court. Moreover,
there is a contrary argument that federal taking law provides a
"floor" and that state taking laws which are less restrictive than
the ESA's taking prohibitions are preempted.6 2 Only future litigation

ESA taking prohibitions "shall not apply ... except to the extent that the taking of any such species
is contrary to the law of such State." Id. In other words, state law ordinarily controls what is a
taking under the ESA.
However, the first parenthetical in ESA § 6(g)(2) arguably provides an exception that federal
taking law remains controlling as to species listed in Appendix I of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna "or otherwise specifically covered by any
other treaty or Federal law." Id. This creates a regulatory scheme where species covered by a federal
treaty or non-ESA federal law receive the full protection of the federal taking prohibitions, while
other species of less federal importance do not.
Yet, this interpretation of the first parenthetical creates a conflict with 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
Section 1533(d) arguably provides that state law is controlling on takings of all threatened species in
a cooperative agreement state, while § 1535(g)(2) arguably removes state control for federal treaty
species, among others. This conflict might be resolved by making § 1533(d) controlling. Section 1535(g)(2)
suggests this result by stating that it is a clarification of the "prohibitions ... authorized pursuant
to ... section[] 1533(d)." Since § 1533(d) does not authorize any federal prohibition against taking
any threatened species which goes beyond state law in a cooperative agreement state, neither does
§ 1535(g)(2).
62. The contrary argument is based on the final sentence of ESA § 6(f):
Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of an endangered species or threatened
species may be more restritive than the exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter
or in any regulation which implements this chapter but not less restrictive than the prohibitions so defined.
16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1988). The contrary argument is that, since state taking law cannot be "less
restrictive" than ESA taking law to be valid, federal law always provides a "floor." Therefore, the
ESA taking prohibitions can always be enforced.
Yet, a careful reading suggests that this is not what ESA § 6(f) says. Instead, it says that state
taking law or regulation cannot be less restrictive than the prohibitions so defined in the ESA. The
ESA seems to define its taking prohibitions in terms of state law and regulations (at least in certain
instances) in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(d), 1535(c)(1)(E)(ii), 1535(g)(2), and 1538(a)(1). Thus, where the ESA
defines its taking prohibitions in terms of state law and regulations, they would not be less restrictive
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will resolve whether state taking law controls what is an ESA taking
in most instances.
4. A Nonfederal Landowner's Responsibility In Avoiding
Takings May Not Include Assisting In The Recovery Of A Listed
Wildlife Species
As we briefly mentioned above, the district court in Palila II
held that nonfederal landowners sometimes must manage their lands
to assist in a species' recovery to avoid a taking, and the Ninth
Circuit declined to rule on this issue. 63 In contrast to the district

court's view, the federal government has twice stated that the taking
prohibition does not require private landowners to assist in species
recovery efforts.
The most prominent statements are in the United States' 1987

amicus brief before the Ninth Circuit in the Palila II case. In that
brief, the United States drew a bright line between actions necessary
to prevent the extinction of the species and actions which merely
retard the species' recovery. It reasoned that habitat modification
actions which would cause extinction are prohibited, but that neither
the ESA nor FWS's regulation on "harm" constrained nonfederal
habitat modification actions which merely retarded the recovery of
the species. 64
than the state law and regulations themselves and, therefore, would not be preempted under ESA § 6(0.
This interpretation of ESA § 6(0 avoids a conflict between: (1) reading § 6(0 as a standard
federal preemption provision; and (2) the reverse preemption provisions of ESA §§ 4(d), 6(c)(1)(E)(ii),
6(g)(2), and 9(a)(1). This interpretation should be favored because statutory conflicts should be avoided
wherever such an interpretation is possible. Even if a statutory conflict cannot be avoided, since most
of the relevant ESA provisions support the "reverse preemption" concept, that concept arguably
should apply to the exclusion of ESA § 6(0.
63. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Haw.
1986). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
64. In pertinent part, the federal brief states:
[1.] [T]he Secretary's interpretation of harm, while including habitat modification as a potential source of harm to endangered species, excludes those modifications to habitat the
effect of which is limited to inhibiting the recovery of a listed species ....
Here, the district court [properly] found such an injury because continued habitat degradation would eventually lead to the extinction of the Palila. In the absence of such circumstances, habitat modification could do no more than have an inhibiting effect on the
recovery of any listed species, an effect that does not actually injure the species in an sense
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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Earlier, a 1981 Solicitor's opinion had reasoned that Palila I was
wrongly decided in part because the evidence showed "the Palila
population to have actually increased" and this meant that the bird
was not being harmed within the meaning of the ESA. 65 This presaged the view in the 1987 amicus brief that habitat modification
actions which merely retard the recovery of a species by suppressing
possible population gains are not ESA takings.
Coal operators and other natural resources developers may desire
to rely on the government's statements if they are accused of an
ESA taking where the habitat modification action merely prevents
the recovery of a listed species, but would not cause the extinction
of the species. However, this strategy is at least undercut by the
Palila district court's holding that habitat modification actions retarding recovery can be "harm" and the government's statements

may not be equally persuasive to a court. 6

similar to the that expressed in the statutory terms defining the word "take."
2. Imposing a duty under Section 9 to avoid habitat modifications that merely prevent or
delay the recovery of an endangered species is not consistent with the overall structure of
the Act. Without the significant qualification in the Secretary's definition (that habitat
modification must result in injury to the species), persons subject to Section 9 would be
required to manage their property in a manner so as to promote the recovery of a listed
species.
The statute, however, creates such a responsibility with respect to the activities and programs
of the agencies of the federal government, and not other owners and managers of property,
such as private entities or the states ... [ESA § 7(a)(1) creates federal agency obligations
to "conserve" or improve the current condition of listed species.] There is no reference to
This omission is a strong indication that Congress
this term, however, in section 9 ....
did not intend, through the [taking] provision of Section 9, to impose a duty to conserve
on such non-federal entities ....
The progress of the [ESA] legislation in the 93d Congress shows that Congress considered
and then rejected a provision that would have made destruction or modification of habitat
This
a per se violation of the statutory prohibition against taking endangered species ....
deletion is a clear indication that the final definition of the term "take" was not intended
to include destruction or modification of habitat that did not have significant negative
consequences for the species ....
Thus, the Secretary's interpretation of the term "harm" to exclude habitat modification
that merely prevents recovery of a listed species accurately reflects Congressional intent.
Brief For The United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-22, Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Nat.
Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2188) (emphasis added).
65. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,492 (1981).
66. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Nat. Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw. 1986).
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The government's statements may in fact be an unconvincing
half-way house attempting to reconcile its regulatory definition of
"harm" as including habitat modification with the policy desire not
to stretch that concept too far. From an environmentalist perspective, the government's statements may not be reflective of the regulatory "harm" definition. The government does not expressly state
that the proper dividing line between an unlawful take and lawful
action is extinction versus recovery. The 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 definition
of "harm" is phrased in terms of a habitat modification which
"significantly impair[s] essential behavioral patterns" of one individual, and a habitat modification which actually retards recovery
usually does so by reducing the breeding success or other behavioral
patterns of at least one individual on the margin. Therefore, an
environmentalist would argue, the government's statements are not
borne out by the language employed in the definition of "harm."
From the perspective of a natural resources developer, the government's statements do not go far enough. The real dividing line
should be that habitat modifications cannot be takings under the
ESA. 67 The government's statements, while perhaps a valiant attempt
at a politically palatable compromise, focus on the wrong distinction.
IV.

THE ESA PROHMTONS ON REMOVING LISTED PLANTS

The ESA prohibits different actions affecting endangered wildlife
species than affecting endangered plant species and grants FWS the
discretion to prohibit the same actions respecting threatened species. 68 The same set of civil penalties, criminal penalties, and injunctive relief actions that apply to listed wildlife species also apply
to listed plant species. 69

The ESA and regulatory prohibitions regarding listed plants are
less comprehensive than those regarding listed wildlife. Strictly
speaking, no taking prohibitions apply to listed plant species. ESA
section 9(a)(2), however, does bar certain types of removal, trans67. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.

68. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(d), 1538(a)(1) (wildlife species), 1538(a)(2) (plant species) (1988).
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portation, and sale of endangered plants? 0 We discuss the plant
removal provisions since they are of primary interest to the coal
industry.
Prior to 1988, the ESA merely made it unlawful to "remove and
reduce to possession any such [endangered plant] species from areas
under Federal jurisdiction." 71 There was no ESA prohibition against
removing endangered plants from nonfederal lands and it was not
unlawful to simply destroy endangered plants anywhere if the destroyed plants were not "removed" from an area of federal jurisdiction.
The 1988 ESA amendments added greater, though not complete,
protection for endangered plants. On federal lands, it is now unlawful to "remove and reduce to possession any such species from
areas under Federal jurisdiction [or to] maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such-area." '72 Thus, the 1988 amendments make the malicious destruction of endangered plants on federal
lands unlawful in addition to carrying forward the prohibition against
removing endangered plants from public lands.
Fortunately for the coal industry, the House Report on the 1988
amendments contains an explicit statement that authorized mining
operations on federal lands would not run afoul of these prohibitions.73 "It is not the Committee's intent that this prohibition [against
maliciously destroying endangered plants] interfere with otherwise
lawful permitted land use operations such as mining, logging, or
grazing on federal lands which might incidentally result in the taking
'74
of listed plants."
On nonfederal lands, the 1988 amendments make it unlawful to
"remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such [endangered
plant] species on any other area in knowing violation of any law
or regulation of any state or in the course of any violation of a

70. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (1988).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1982).

72. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988).
73. H.R. REp. No. 467, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1987).
74. Id.
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state criminal trespass law." ' 75 Accordingly, there would be an ESA
violation for removing endangered plants from nonfederal lands only
if there were a knowing violation of state law, as is arguably the
case for the taking of listed wildlife species .76
These provisions should not significantly affect mineral operations on nonfederal lands as most states do not have laws barring
the destruction of plants in connection with land development activities. The Senate Report on the 1988 amendments recognizes that
"landowners traditionally have been accorded greater rights with
respect to plants growing on their lands than with respect to animals" and explains that the new language "does not interfere with
the rights traditionally accorded landowners." ' 77 The new prohibitions, instead of being directed at development by landowners, are
primarily directed at those who trespass on private lands to obtain
endangered plant species.
V.

Tim ESA SECTION 7 CONSTRAINTS ON FEDERALLY
AUTHORIZED ACTIONS

ESA section 7 creates special obligations for actions taken or
approved by federal agencies. In subsection A below, we discuss the
procedural duty to consult and the substantive limits on federal
agency actions under ESA section 7(a)(2). In subsection B, we describe federal agency duties under ESA section 7(a)(1). Finally, subsection C discusses how these duties apply to mineral development
activities.

A.

Duties Under ESA Section 7(a)(2)

ESA section 7(a)(2) is the best known and most frequently litigated provision of the ESA. It provides that:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency

75. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988).
76. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
77. S.REP. No. 240, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMhiN. NEWS 2700, 2712.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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(hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency action") is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has been granted an exemption
for such action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. In
fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best sci78
entific and commercial data available.

ESA section 7(a)(2) applies only to actions "authorized, funded,
or carried out" by federal agencies. Consequently, the provision
does not apply to purely private actions. Private actions are subject
only to the taking and other constraints of ESA section 9.
However, any type of federal agency approval required for private development, such as the "granting of licenses, contracts, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid," triggers ESA
section 7(a)(2) duties.79 In these federal situations involving approval
of private development, the burden of ESA section 7 compliance is
on the federal agency and the private developer's primary duties are
to supply information and to abide by any ESA restrictions imposed
in the federal permit.8 0
FWS serves as the government's biological expert under ESA
section 7(a)(2). The federal agency proposing the action (action
agency) consults with FWS, and FWS provides its view on whether
the proposed action complies with the ESA section 7(a)(2) duties to
avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of listed species and to

avoid adverse modification of designated critical habitat. FWS acts
in an advisory role and has no veto power over federal actions it
believes would cause jeopardy. The action agency is charged with

ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance and may decide to take an action
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). FNVS's regulations on ESA § 7(a)(2) compliance appear at
50 C.F.R. Part 402.
79. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989) (definition of "Action").
80. ESA § 7(a)(2) places the duties to consult and to avoid jeopardy on the federal agency,
not the private developer. A qualified applicant may provide information for ESA consultation or
participate in consultation if the applicant is the designated nonfederal representative. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14 (1989). The private developer's principal duty is to comply with the permit conditions imposed
for ESA compliance. See Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712,
715 (Ist Cir. 1979). This duty is more a function of contract law and the applicable regulatory scheme
(such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act) than of ESA law as ESA § 7 does not
impose duties on private entities.
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notwithstanding a jeopardy opinion from FWS. 81 However, an agency
acts against FWS's advice at its peril and courts tend to give greater
deference to FWS's biological judgment. 2

The first ESA section 7(a)(2) duty on a federal agency is the
procedural duty to consult with FWS prior to taking any action
which may affect listed species. This duty to engage in some form
of ESA consultation prior to taking action is nearly absolute. 83
FWS has developed two forms of consultation under ESA section
7(a)(2), informal consultation and formal consultation. 84 In many
cases, a cursory review will show that the proposed action will not
adversely affect a listed species or its critical habitat. To avoid burdening federal agencies with the cumbersome requirements of formal
consultation in these cases, FWS's regulations permit a shortened
informal consultation where the federal action agency determines,
and FWS concurs, that the "proposed action is not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat." 85 In these cases,
informal consultation consists of telephone conferences and correspondence that can be completed in a few days or weeks. After
FWS's review during informal consultation confirms that the pro81. As the preamble to FWS's final 50 C.F.R. Part 402 rulemaking states:
The Service performs strictly an advisory function under section 7 by consulting with other
Federal agencies to identify and help resolve conflicts between listed species and their critical
habitat and proposed actions. As part of its role, the Service issues biological opinions to
assist the Federal agencies in conforming their proposed actions to the requirements of
section 7. However, the Federal-agency makes the ultimate decision as to whether its proposed action will satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2). The Service recognizes that the
Federal agency has the primary responsibility for implementing section 7's substantive command, and the final rule does not usurp that function.
51 Fed. Reg. 19,928 (1986).
82. E.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) ("we defer to the agency
[FWS] with the more appropriate expertise").
83. See id. at 1386. The only statutory exemption from prior ESA consultation is in Presidentially declared disaster areas. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(p).
84. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14 (1989).
Additionally, ESA § 7(a)(3) allows a prospective permit applicant to institute early consultation
to obtain a preliminary indication on whether his proposed project would comply with the ESA. See
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.11 (1989). Finally, ESA § 7(a)(4) requires federal
agencies to confer with FWS on actions affecting species proposed for listing to obtain FVS's view
on ESA constraints if the species is listed, but the ESA does not substantively limit actions affecting
species which are not yet listed even though proposed for listing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988);
50 C.F.R. § 402.10 (1989).
85. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b) (1989). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (1989).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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posed action is not likely to adversely affect a listed species or designated critical habitat, the action can proceed.
Formal consultation is reserved for situations where the proposed
action may adversely affect a listed species or its critical habitat. In
these situations, FWS issues a biological opinion on whether the
proposed action would comply with the ESA section 7(a)(2) duties
to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of a listed species and
86
to avoid adverse modification of critical habitat.
Formal consultation is initiated by the action agency which must
supply FWS with the best scientific and commercial data available
on the proposed action and its effects on listed species and critical
habitat.17 If the proposed activity would constitute a major federal
action requiring an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act, the action agency must prepare a
biological assessment before initiating formal ESA consultation.88 As
a practical matter, a mine operator or other developer seeking a
federal permit often bears the primary responsibility for obtaining
the information required to initiate consultation.
After the action agency submits this information, FWS conducts
additional analysis and ordinarily should complete a draft biological
opinion for review by the action agency and the applicant within
ninety days of the initiation of formal consultation. The final biological opinion is to follow within forty-five days.8 9
FWS gauges ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance through the following analytical approach. First, it determines the "environmental
baseline" which consists largely of the current environmental conditions and the present status of the listed species and critical hab-

86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1989) (describing the biological opinion
and formal consultation process).
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c) and (d) (1989). The failure to use the best scientific and commercial
data available may invalidate the ESA consultation and require a new consultation. See Roosevelt
Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (1989).
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e) and (g)(5) (1989).
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itat. 90 FWS then adds the "effects of the action" and "cumulative
effects" to that environmental baseline to determine what will be
the future condition of the listed species and any critical habitat. 9'

Finally, FWS makes a "before and after" comparison - comparing
the status of the species and its critical habitat under the environ-

mental baseline with the status after the addition of the effects of
the action and cumulative effects - to assess whether its status
would be sufficiently degraded to constitute jeopardy or adverse

modification of a critical habitat. 92
FWS's regulations make it clear that jeopardy and adverse modification of critical habitat are incremental, significant degradation
standards. To "[j]eopardize the continued existence of" a listed species, the action and cumulative effects must "reduce appreciably the

likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in
the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of
that species." ' 93 An injury to the species' likelihood of recovery alone
90. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989). The environmental baseline is defined as:
the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human
activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the
action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and the
impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in
process.
Id. (definition of "Effects of the action"). Thus, the environmental baseline is the current environmental reality as modified by the anticipated effects of federal actions that have completed ESA
consultation and the effects of contemporaneous nonfederal actions. A 1981 Department of the Interior
Solicitor's opinion first developed and explained the environmental baseline concept. See "Cumulative
Impacts Under Section 7 Of The Endangered Species Act," 88 Interior Decisions 903, 907-08 (1981).
91. See id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3) (1989). "Effects of the action":
refers to the direct and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together
with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that action,
that will be added to the environmental baseline.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989).
In addition to considering all impacts of the proposed action and interrelated development, 50
C.F.R. § 402.14(g) specifies that FWS will also consider "cumulative effects." "Cumulative effects"
are the "effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably
certain to occur." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989).
This method charges the federal action under consultation not only with the ESA impacts of
that action, but also with the impacts of unrelated actions covered under cumulative effects. It is
questionable whether this complies with the ESA, as the statute seems to direct that the consultation
occur only on the effects of the "action" itself. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) and (b) (1988).
The inclusion of actions interrelated with and interdependent upon the proposed action in the
definition of "Effects of the action" is less controversial. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989).
92. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.1 4 (g) (1989).
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does not warrant a jeopardy opinion; a jeopardy opinion is warranted only when the incremental effects would appreciably reduce
94
the likelihood of survival of the species.
To adversely modify a critical habitat (the other ESA section
7(a)(2) limit), the incremental effects must "appreciably diminish[]
the value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of
a listed species." ' 95 Thus, not all modifications of a critical habitat
are precluded.
If the action receives a "no jeopardy" biological opinion, it can
go forward as complying with ESA section 7(a)(2). If the action
receives a "jeopardy" biological opinion, FWS must strive to identify "reasonable and prudent alternatives" or project modifications
96
that would allow the action to proceed.
If the action agency or a court concludes that the proposed action
would violate ESA section 7(a)(2), the action is prohibited. This is
the teaching of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,97 in which the
snail darter at least temporarily stopped the completion of the Tellico
Dam. After the Supreme Court found that ESA section 7(a)(2) absolutely prohibited federal actions causing jeopardy, Congress created a cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee and allowed it
to grant case-by-case exemptions from the ESA. 9
FWS's biological opinion also addresses issues other than ESA
section 7(a)(2) compliance. Where the proposed action would comply
with that provision, but still would result in the incidental taking

94. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,934 (1986) (explaining jeopardy opinion requirement in the preamble
to the final rules). The 1981 Solicitor's opinion explains that there is a "cushion" of resources that
may be used up before the jeopardy limit is reached. 88 Interior Decisions at 907.
95. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1989) ("Destruction or adverse modification").
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(A) (1988); 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.14(g)(3) (1989).
97. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
98. The Endangered Species Committee provisions were added to the ESA in 1978 and 1982.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(o) (1988). The procedures required before an action can get to the Endangered
Species Committee are cumbersome, and the ESA exemption standards are rigorous. See id.; 50 C.F.R.
Parts 450-53 (1989).
In its twelve year history, only two actions have been reviewed by the Committee. The Committee rejected an ESA exemption for the Tellico Dam (but it was subsequently exempted from the
ESA by act of Congress) and granted an ESA exemption with mitigation conditions to the Grayrocks
Dam. See M. BE", THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLI E LAW 364-65 (1983).
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of individuals of a listed species, the 1982 ESA amendments and
regulations require FWS to issue an incidental take statement.9 The
statement specifies the amount of allowed incidental taking and actions conforming to the statement are immune from ESA taking
prosecution. The ESA provides that the "applicant" for a federal
permit or license receives the benefit of an incidental take statement.
Finally, FWS may provide its "conservation recommendations"
in the biological opinion.'0e These are recommendations under ESA
section 7(a)(1) on actions that could be taken to help conserve or
improve the status of the listed species or its critical habitat. FWS's
regulation clarifies that the "recommendations are advisory and are
not intended to carry any binding legal force." Thus, the action
agency has the discretion to decline to implement these recommendations.
B. FederalAgency Duties Under ESA Section 7(a)(1)
Federal agencies, in addition to having a duty to not significantly
degrade the condition of listed species and critical habitat under
section 7(a)(2), may have a limited duty under ESA section 7(a)(1)
to assist in "conservation"'' °0 efforts to improve the condition of
such species and habitat. ESA section 7(a)(1) provides that:
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall review other programs administered by him
and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other

Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title.102

99. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) and (o) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1989).
100. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(j) (1989).
101. "Conservation" is defined to mean:
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species
or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter
are no longer necessary.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1988).
Thus, "conservation" essentially means the use of all methods necessary to bring a listed species
to the point at which it may be de-listed. This conservation goal may be unrealistic. The Department
of the Interior recently estimated that it would take $4.6 billion to recover all presently known endangered species, while current annual appropriations are only $8.4 million. Audit Report The Endangered Species Program 11 (Interior Inspector General Report No. 90-98, Sept. 1990).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988).
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Due to the first sentence in ESA section 7(a)(1), some courts
have stated that Department of the Interior (Interior) agencies have
a special duty to undertake programs to conserve or improve the
fate of listed species without specifying the extent of that duty.103
However, it appears that an Interior agency has no absolute duty
to structure all its actions to maximize conservation benefits. One
court has held that an Interior agency has discretion on the types
of conservation programs it will adopt and has no duty to implement
a recovery plan.10 Moreover, an absolute duty to conserve is inconsistent with the language that Interior actions need only be in
"furtherance" of the ESA's purposes. There are also additional
grounds for rejecting the notion of an absolute duty to conserve as
presented below.
Other federal agencies have an even more limited ESA section
7(a)(1) duty to carry out some "programs for the conservation of
endangered and threatened species." The scope of this duty has not
been defined by case law. The Ninth Circuit recently stated that
non-Interior agencies have "some discretion" in choosing what conservation programs they will implement in holding that the Navy
Department did not abuse its discretion in declining to undertake
an ineffective conservation program.10 5
There are several reasons that federal agencies should not be
deemed to have an all-encompassing duty to structure all actions to
maximize the conservation of listed species and critical habitat. First,
if they did, this would swallow the "no jeopardy" duty of ESA
section 7(a)(2) and make it meaningless. This is not a preferred con-

103. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1984)

(stating that § 7(a)(1) "direct[s] that the Secretary actively pursue a species conservation policy" and
upholding the Secretary's decision to manage a water reservoir to conserve a listed species).

104. National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 387-89 (D. Wyo. 1987).
ESA § 4(f) defines a recovery plan as a plan for the "conservation and survival" of a listed species.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (1988). That provision directs FWS to prepare a recovery plan for every listed
species after receiving public comment. The recovery plan is somewhat of a "wish list" of actions
that could be taken, if sufficient money and manpower were available, to improve the fate of the
species to the point it could be de-listed. No ESA provision creates a duty to implement a recovery
plan or makes the violation of a recovery plan unlawful.
105. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,
1418 (9th Cir. 1990).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

struction and seems to be an unreasonable construction since Congress has focused on the "no jeopardy" duty as being the primary
ESA duty on federal agencies.
Second, one of the congressional committees with ESA jurisdiction has stated that there is no duty to conserve listed species
where a federal agency is approving a developmental action such as

a permit for a coal mine. 1°6 This is a desirable reading of the ESA
wherein developmental actions are subject only to the thoroughly
debated standards of ESA section 7(a)(2), while agencies may sep-

arately, in their discretion, use their own funds for conservation
programs.
Third, FWS has agreed with the Committee's interpretation and

has adopted a regulation stating that conservation measures are
"discretionary." 107 Since courts generally must defer to regulatory

interpretations of statutes, arguably a court should conclude that
there are no enforceable ESA section 7(a)(1) conservation duties, at
least with respect to developmental actions.
C. ESA Section 7 As Applied To The Coal Industry
ESA section 7 is applied to the coal industry principally in three
different ways. First, any time coal exploration or development re106. In its comments on FWS's 50 C.F.R. Part 402 regulations, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries stated:
[W]e do not believe that it was intended that section 7(a)(1) require developmental agency
actions to be treated as conservation programs for endangered or threatened species. We
also do not believe that all of the conservation recommendations of the Secretary have to
be followed for this requirement to be met. Such an interpretation would render the much
debated provisions of section 7(a)(2) redundant and essentially meaningless and bring about
endless litigation.
51 Fed. Reg. 19,954 (1986).
107. In the rulemaking preamble, FWS stated that the "Service agrees with the Committee's
comments." 51 Fed. Reg. 19,954 (1986). Thus, FWS, like the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, has interpreted ESA § 7(a)(1) as not applying to developmental actions such as federal
approval of mineral development.
Moreover, FWS adopted a regulation stating that its ESA § 7(a)(1) conservation recommendations
"are not intended to carry any binding legal force" and that the adoption of such recommendations
is "discretionary" with the action agency. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14j) (1989). Since ESA § 7(a)(1) provides
that conservation measures are developed "in consultation with" FWS and since FWS's regulation
states that such measures are "discretionary," this seems to be a regulatory interpretation that the
action agency has discretion to adopt or not adopt an ESA § 7(a)(1) conservation program. Courts
must generally defer to statutory interpretations embodied in regulations. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/6
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quires authorization by a federal agency, this triggers the standard
ESA section 7 consultation process, duty to avoid jeopardy and
adverse modification of critical habitat under ESA section 7(a)(2),
and possible imposition of ESA section 7(a)(1) conservation measures, as described above. Fortunately for the coal industry, there
have been few reported problems with ESA section 7 compliance to
date.
Second, ESA conflicts are resolved prior to federal coal leasing
under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), which is one reason for the
few conflicts between the ESA and coal development on federal
lands. Section 522(b) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) requires the Interior Secretary to conduct a review of federal lands to determine what areas are unsuitable
for surface coal mining.108 The 1976 amendments to the MLA also
generally preclude federal coal leasing until the coal lands are included in a "comprehensive land-use plan" and it has been determined that coal leasing "is compatible with such plan."'' I
Pursuant to these authorities, during land use planning, the Bureau of Land Management conducts a review of what federal lands
are unsuitable for federal coal leasing where surface coal mining
operations would be conducted. Specific unsuitability criteria have
been adopted at 43 C.F.R. § 3461.5.
Criterion 9 creates a desirable process for resolving ESA section
7 conflicts prior to federal coal leasing." 0 It provides that federal
lands containing designated critical habitat for listed species or containing habitat considered to be of essential value to listed species
will generally be found unsuitable for federal coal leasing.
However, criterion 9 provides an exception allowing federal coal
leasing and approval of coal mining operations if FWS determines
that the action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of the listed species and/or its critical habitat."'' This paraphrases

108.
109.
110.
111.

30
30
43
43

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§
§
§
§

1272(b) (1988).
201(a)(3)(A)(i) (1988).
3461.5(i) (1989).
3461.5(i)(2) (1989).
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the standards of ESA section 7(a)(2). Finally, criterion 9 does not
apply to lands on which the operator "made substantial legal and
financial commitments prior to January 4, 1977," lands on which
surface mining operations were conducted as of SMCRA's enactment, and lands permitted for mining. 112
The third and most pervasive way in which ESA section 7 affects
the coal industry is through the regulatory program created under
SMCRA. The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) has adopted a series
of regulations which ensure that all coal mining operations comply
with ESA section 7(a)(2) and that ESA consultation is conducted
where necessary. The regulations include: (1) performance standards
which prohibit surface and underground coal mining operations which
are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or
adversely modify their critical habitat"3 ; (2) notification and consultation requirements which require the operator to notify the regulatory authority whenever any listed species is discovered in the
permit area and which require the regulatory authority to then consult with FWS to determine the conditions under which mining operations may proceed;" 4 (3) information requirements which require
a permit applicant to submit information on listed and proposed
species and their critical habitats likely to be found in the permit
area and which require a protection and enhancement plan on how
the applicant will minimize disturbance of these resources and enhance these resources to the extent practicable;" s (4) permit approval
standards which require that the regulatory authority affirmatively
find that the coal mining operation would not affect the continued
existence of a listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat
before granting any mining permit;1 6 and (5) criteria for approval
of a state regulatory program by OSM which require an affirmative
finding that the state has the necessary authority to administer and
112. 43 C.F.R. § 3461.5(i)(3) (1989). A district court opinion holds that these exemptions are
required by SMCRA § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (1988), which "takes precedence" over the

earlier enacted ESA. Texaco, Inc. v. Andrus, No. 79-2448, slip op. at 12 and n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 15,
1980).
113. 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.97(b), 817.97(b) (1989).
114. Id.
115. 30 C.F.R. §§ 780.16, 784.21 (1989).
116. 30 C.F.R. § 773.16(c)(9) (1989).
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enforce the permit conditions and performance standards which protect listed species '17 .
The ESA-related SMCRA regulations spring from several statutory sources. SMCRA sections 515(b)(24) and 516(b)(11) require
performance standards for surface and underground mining operations which minimize disturbances to fish and wildlife values to
the extent possible and which enhance such resources where practicable.118 SMCRA section 507(b) has been interpreted to allow OSM
to specify fish and wildlife information and plan requirements for
an acceptable SMCRA permit application. 19
More generally, SMCRA section 501(b) grants OSM the authority
to publish regulations for a permanent SMCRA regulatory program
including regulations on performance standards and on the approval
of state programs which grant primacy to the state regulatory authority. 120 This is where ESA section 7(a)(2) enters the picture. Since
ESA section 7(a)(2) applies to all actions by federal agencies, it requires OSM to ensure that it would not jeopardize the continued
existence of listed species or adversely modify critical habitat by
adopting SMCRA regulations or by approving state programs. Consequently, the regulations include the ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance
standards.
Moreover, the OSM approval of a state regulatory program would
be the last federal action before the state assumes primacy and could
issue state SMCRA permits to mine. In order to ensure that this
federal "delegation" action would not result in ESA section 7(a)(2)
violations in the future, OSM included requirements that state regulatory authorities consult with FWS on ESA matters and not allow
activities which would violate the ESA section 7(a)(2) standards.1 2'

117. 30 C.F.R. § 732.15 (1989).
118. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(b)(24), 1266(b)(11) (1988).
119. Fish and wildlife information is not directly required by 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (1988). Yet,

the courts have held that OSM has discretionary authority to require such information, as is most
recently recounted in National Wildlife Federation v. Interior Department, 31 ENv'T REP. CAS. (BNA)
1617, 1637-38 (D.D.C. June 8, 1990). That case affirmed OSM's 1988 revisions to the ESA and fish

and wildlife regulations.
120. 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
121. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 773.16(c)(9), 816.97(b), 817.97(b) (1989).
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Thus, this federal "hook" of approval of state regulatory programs has broadly expanded the reach of ESA section 7(a)(2). Ordinarily, actions subject only to state approval are not subject to
either the ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance standards or its consultation requirement. Yet, for coal mining subject to state regulatory
authority delegated by SMCRA, the ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance
standards and consultation requirement do apply even though the
state permit to mine is not a federal action.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ESA is becoming more than a paper tiger. The ESA taking
and jeopardy prohibitions, and possible duty to assist in conservation of listed species, have halted or delayed many land development actions. This trend may increase in the future as more species
are listed, as environmental groups become more sophisticated in
the use of the ESA to thwart natural resources development and as
FWS adopts a more aggressive enforcement posture. ESA requirements have already become substantially integrated into the regulation of the surface and the surface effects of underground mines
under SMCRA. The coal industry lawyer must spot ESA issues early
in order to minimize regulatory constraints on mining and ultimately
to avoid having the right to mine itself "jeopardized" by the requirements of the Endangered Species Act.
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